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Abstract—Software protection is an essential aspect of 
information security to withstand malicious activities on software, 
and preserving software assets. However, software developers still 
lacks a methodology for the assessment of the deployed protections. 
To solve these issues, we present a novel attack simulation based 
software protection assessment method to assess and compare 
various protection solutions. Our solution relies on Petri Nets to 
specify and visualize attack models, and we developed a Monte 
Carlo based approach to simulate attacking processes and to deal 
with uncertainty. Then, based on this simulation and estimation, a 
novel protection comparison model is proposed to compare 
different protection solutions. Lastly, our attack simulation based 
software protection assessment method is presented. We illustrate 
our method by means of a software protection assessment process 
to demonstrate that our approach can provide a suitable software 
protection assessment for developers and software companies. 
Keywords—Software Security; Software Protection Assessment; 
Attack Simulation; Monte Carlo Method; Petri Net 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, software is an extremely important asset for customers to 
support and execute their businesses. Consequently, software protection 
has attracted much attention from developers and software companies in 
terms of software security. To ensure security against malicious 
software attacks, many tools have been developed, such as data 
obfuscation, tamper-proofing, code splitting, software watermarking, 
among others [13].  
In this regard, assessing the effectiveness of these protections is 
crucial before embedding them into real commercial products. In 
particular, in practical use cases, like mobile computing, multiple 
protection methods could be utilised together as Protection Solutions 
(PSs) to thwart actual threats. Therefore, a software protection 
assessment method needs to be able to assess potential PSs with respect 
to various types of attacks. This is the context where this paper takes 
place.   
Currently, one main type of software protection assessment [15] 
focuses on the assessment of individual protection methods and does not 
consider PSs with multiple protection methods. Another kind of 
software protection assessment [14] discussed general software 
measurement frameworks for protection, and did not involve PSs either. 
Hence, none of these two approaches is suitable for protection 
assessment in terms of complicated PSs to provide convincing results.  
Besides, for real software attack processes, uncertainty is another 
challenge for these existing assessment methods. In uncertain software 
attacking processes, there are many random variables and factors at play, 
such as the computing resources for attacking, the decisions or 
selections made by specific attackers, and so on. Moreover, specific 
environments, like mobile computing, could jeopardise this uncertainty 
by the fragmentation of mobile OS. To capture this phenomenon, we 
could use a non-deterministic attack simulation based on the Monte 
Carlo method to describe the real uncertain software attacking processes. 
This idea will be the basic tool for our proposed method.  
Petri Net (PN) based attack models are suitable objects to model 
software attacks [8, 10], and in this work we use them to support 
software protection assessment in terms of Monte Carlo based attack 
simulation.  
In real software protection implementations, assessing every 
possible PSs in each specific software protection situation is a huge task, 
considering the myriad of possible combinations of various PSs 
(multiple protection methods with their parameters) and various 
software protection situations (multiple attacks with weights). Hence, 
the relations (comparing results) among PSs under protection 
assessments are particularly valuable for this. Our assessment method 
can use a comparison model to manage the comparisons among PSs on 
the basis of the attack simulation. As such, the protection comparison 
model is the central component of our assessment methodology. 
To summarize our approach, our novel Attack Simulation based 
Software Protection Assessment Method (ASSPAM) uses a Monte Carlo 
based Attack Simulation (MCAS) to simulate specific software attack 
processes with implementing PSs, based on PN based attack models. 
Then, using the results obtained from the MCAS, our Attack Simulation 
based Protection Comparison Model (ASPCM) provides a numeric 
estimation of the PS and thus this can be compared in the ASSPAM to 
search for the best PS.  
The main contributions of this paper includes: 1) a Monte Carlo 
based attack simulation for protection assessment; 2) a novel attack 
simulation based protection comparison model to compare PSs with 
numeric confidences; 3) a novel attack simulation based software 
protection assessment method to run the assessment. 
This research has been carried out within the European FP7 project 
ASPIRE, Advanced Software Protection: Integration, Research, and 
Exploitation [1]. Our method focuses on the assessment of PSs, and does 
not cover the generation and optimisation of these PSs. Some other 
components of ASPIRE store security experts’ knowledge and 
experiences in the Knowledge Base, and generates PSs by means of 
reasoning technique. Besides, to generate and optimise PSs, there are 
some aspects, such as the cost of protections, the dependency among 
protection methods, and so on, which are out of the scope of this paper.  
Furthermore, compared to traditional PNs [8], our PN based attack 
models focus on attack steps (transitions) with related simulation 
information. Therefore, some features in traditional PNs are not 
involved in this paper, such as tokens and liveness. PNs with full 
characteristics will be utilised by other software protection assessment 
approaches in the ASPIRE project. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes related work. 
Section III discusses preliminary concepts and background. In Section 
IV, our new method is proposed. In Section V, we use a protection 
assessment instance to demonstrate that our proposed method can 
provide suitable protection assessments. Section VI concludes this paper 
and points out future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
This section introduces existing research progress in the areas of 
software analysis and measurement, attack modelling, Monte Carlo 
simulation and software protection assessment.  
A. Software Analysis and Measurement 
Software analysis and measurement are important areas in software 
engineering [2]. For example, in the software process improvement area, 
measurement has been emphasised as a central function and activity [3]. 
From a software security viewpoint, Tonella et al. [4 ] presented a 
general framework to assess a software by various measurable features 
and metrics to withstand software attacks. Related software analysis and 
measurement mechanisms are valuable references for our software 
protection assessment.   
B. Attack Modelling  
Currently, attack modelling is an important area of information 
security. Attack Tree models and Attack Graphs are widely used for 
representing network attacks, virus attacks, and so on [5,6]. For example, 
the scalable modelling process is studied for attack graph generation 
with logic formalism in [7 ]. However, none of them can precisely 
describe preconditions, actions and external impacts in software attack 
processes properly. 
In this regard, Petri Nets (PNs) were originally introduced as a 
modelling technique for concurrent systems [8].These nets can model 
specific cyber-physical attacks on smart grid [ 9 ]. Taking software 
protection as objective, Wang et al. [10] focused on coloured PN based 
attack modelling. As discussed in Section I, PN based attack models are 
suitable to describe preconditions, post-conditions and actions and, 
therefore, they will play a core role in our attack modelling and 
protection assessment. 
C. Monte Carlo Simulation 
The Monte Carlo simulation (method) is a powerful tool for dealing 
with uncertainty and probability [11]. It is very useful for analysing and 
simulating complex systems and problems, due to its flexibility and 
error-quantifiable features [12].  
Hence, the Monte Carlo method is a suitable technique to simulate 
complex systems in terms of multiple random variables. As discussed in 
Section I, in this paper, we assess various PSs in real uncertain attacking 
processes to provide suitable PSs for developers and software 
companies. With the help of the Monte Carlo method, we can use attack 
simulation to support the ASSPAM when assess protections. 
D. Software Protection Assessment 
As previous discussed, software protection assessment is an 
essential part of software protection [13]. Basile et al. [14] described a 
unified high-level software attack model to assess software protections 
for developers. Experiments have been designed to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of related software protection techniques 
for code obfuscation [15] [18] [19].  
Existing protection assessment methods are too specialised or too 
general to cope with uncertain software attack processes and PSs. That 
is why, to overcome this issue, our ASSPAM will be relying on PN based 
attack models and Monte Carlo based attack simulations.  
III. PETRI NET BASED ATTACK MODEL  
In this section, we discuss the PN based attack model for attack 
simulation, which is the basic supporting tool of our ASSPAM, 
especially for our MCAS.   
A. Petri Net based Software Attack Modelling 
PN based attack models are the essential rationale for our 
assessment method in this paper. Generally speaking, PN based attack 
models represent all possible attack paths and attack steps in software 
attacks, and support the attack simulations on these attacks via some 
extra information.  
Based on existing work [8,10], we present our models to describe 
software attacks for protection assessment: 
Definition 1 PSAM: A PN based Software Attack Model for 
simulation is a five-tuple, PSAM = (P, T, A, EC, AE), where:  
• P is a finite set of states, represented by circles. These states 
model sub-goals reached by an attacker after having executed a 
number of attack steps. P={P0,……,Pn}. 
• T is a finite set of transitions, represented by rectangles. These 
transitions model attack steps, i.e., specific actions undertaken by 
attackers to reach a sub-goal on a path to the final end goal of their 
attack. T={T0,……,Tm}. 
• PĤTĮØ, PģT=Ø. 
• A ك {T×P} Ĥ {P×T}, is a multi-set of direct arcs, relating sub-
goals and attack steps. A={A0,……,Al}. 
• EC represents the Effort Consumption. It is a finite set of 
attacker’s effort consumed at each transition in T, where 
EC={ec0,……,ecm}. It is utilised as the preconditions.  
• AE represents the Attacker Effort. It is a finite set of attacker’s 
effort at each state in P, where AE={ae0,……,aen}. Attackers have the 
capability including resources and skills to execute attacks on 
protected or unprotected software. This “capability” is represented 
with AE and will be “consumed” in transitions of attack processes via 
EC in attack simulations. 
EC and AE will be discussed further in the next subsection, which 
are the key issues to support the attack simulations for protection 
assessment.  
 
Figure 1. PN based attack model on a one-time password generator 
As an example of a relevant use case, Figure 1 and Table 1 present 
relevant attack paths on a One-Time Password (OTP) generator [16] by 
means of PSAM: P0 is the starting state in which attackers start to attack 
the OTP software, and P10 is the final state which means a successful 
attacking. Specially, this success means that attackers obtain the seed of 
the OTP generator. P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, and P9 are nine 
intermediate states in the attack, corresponding to different sub-goals 
being reached. T0, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T8, T9, T10, and T11 are 
eleven transitions, which describe various attack steps (actions) in attack 
processes, detailed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Attack Table of PN based attack model on a one-time password 
generator  
 Description/Objective Input Output 
T0 Identify PIN section of 
the code 
Original code Piece of code 
containing PIN 
checking 
T1 Bypass PIN check Piece of code 
containing PIN 
checking 
N/A 
T2 Bypass PIN check Piece of code 
containing PIN 
checking 
PIN obtained 
T3 Set-up for parallel run N/A N/A 
T4 Unlock provisioning 
phase 
Original code Reusable 
provisioning 
phase (piece of 
code) 
T5 Fake server setting N/A Server ready 
T6 AES decryption code 
identification 
Fake server (P5) + 
Reusable 
provisioning code 
(P6) 
Piece of code 
containing the 
AES 
deciphering 
algorithm 
T8 Seed recovery AES decryption 
code 
+ 
real server 
Seed 
T9 Code pruning for XOR 
localization 
Original code Code 
fragments 
(executed 
before OTP 
display) 
T10 XOR chains 
identification 
Code fragments 
(P8) 
Sequence of 
XOR 
operations 
(piece of code) 
T11 Seed recovery Sequence of XOR 
operations 
Seed 
PSAM is the basic supporting tool in this paper by providing attack 
models with attack paths and steps, and the part with AE and EC will be 
introduced further in the next subsection to complete the model.  
B. Effort Consumption and Attacker Effort  
In this subsection, we detail the Effort Consumption (EC) and the 
Attacker Effort (AE) as the part of the PSAM to support attack simulation 
for protection assessment particularly.  
In this paper, we use uniform distributions to describe Effort 
Consumption—EC and eci. For each eci, a Maximum boundary—Maxi 
and a Minimum boundary—Mini decide this random variable by the 
uniform distribution in equation (1). 
 ],0[),,(},,...,,...,{ 0 miMaxMinfecececececEC iiimi    (1) 
In equation (1), fec() represents the sampling process of the uniform 
distribution with two boundaries: Mini and Maxi. For example, T0 in the 
OTP attack model is to “Identify the PIN check portion of the code”. 
Both Max0 and Min0 can be set in the attack modelling by users or 
security experts in industry, based on real attack data. After that, ec0 is 
the random variable with the uniform distribution and two boundaries: 
Max0 and Min0. Both boundaries can be increased due to the fact that 
some protections have been applied: for example, when some software 
protection methods increase the code size or the flow complexity, this 
can make the T0 attack step more difficult, which will change the 
uniform distribution for ec0 with Max0 and Min0. These methods could 
be specific PSs to change ec0. The relations between methods and 
transitions are decided by users, as well as existing knowledge. In other 
words, these Mini and Maxi (and EC) depend on various PSs.  
Another concept of PSAM is AE, which represents the current effort 
of the attacker in the state of this attack process. AE can be described by 
equation (2). In this equation, ae0 is the attacker effort before attack 
processes (in the initial place). In this paper, we set ae0 as a random 
variable with a normal distribution. 
},...,,...,{ 0 ni aeaeaeAE                              (2) 
As introduced in Section I, since the attacker is one key part of the 
simulation, we will use a normal distribution to represent real uncertain 
attacking processes for one attacker. 
Using a PSAM is the basis of our method in this paper, and the attack 
simulation, protection comparison model and protection assessment 
method rely on this.  
In the next section, we will introduce the main content in this 
paper—ASSPAM.  
IV. ATTACK SIMULATION BASED SOFTWARE 
PROTECTION ASSESSMENT METHOD 
Based on previous discussions, we will introduce our novel 
ASSPAM in three steps: firstly, a MCAS simulates attack processes with 
PSs, based on PN based attack models described in Section III; secondly, 
we will introduce our ASPCM to compare different PSs based on 
previous attack simulations; lastly, ASSPAM will be introduced based 
on MCAS and ASPCM to provide suitable PSs as the protection 
assessment results.  
A. Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation 
Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation (MCAS) includes two parts: 
the Single Attack Process Simulation (SAPS) and the Monte Carlo 
Method. They will be introduced in the following. 
1) Single Attack Process Simulation 
The main process of Single Attack Process Simulation (SAPS) 
works as follows: in one PSAM (as a Directed Acyclic Graph), one 
attacker will try to move from the starting state to the final state. If he/she 
successes, the result of this SAPS is TRUE; otherwise, it is FALSE. It 
can be viewed as a route searching process in the directed acyclic graph. 
In SAPS, in each node, e.g. transition, we use the Passing 
Probability—PP to control the probability that the attacker completes 
this transition (attack step) and reach the next state. 
Passing Probability (PP): A finite set for each transition in T, and 
ppi ę PP, i ę [0,m].  
],0[,
),1tanh(
,0
mi
ecaeecae
ecae
pp
iCURiCUR
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i ®¯­ t
          (3) 
In equation (3), eci comes from equation (1), which is the effort 
consumption for each attack step. And aeCUR comes from equation (2), 
which is the current attacker effort in one attack simulation process. If 
aeCUR is smaller than eci, the probability is zero, which means that the 
current attacker effort is too low to complete this attack step. Otherwise, 
if aeCUR is not smaller than eci, the passing probability is required to be 
monotonically increasing and in the range of [0, 1) when x is in ),0[ f . 
To match this, we use the hyperbolic tangent function:
)1()1()tanh( 22 xx eex   . 
Besides, after discussing the pre-conditions of transitions (PP), the 
actions of transitions will focus on the changing on AE and the current 
place. 
®¯­ 
 
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In equation (4), for transition Ti, on the probability of ppi, aeCUR will 
be subtracted by eci, which means that the attacker passes this transition 
to arrive the next place after this transition. Otherwise (i.e., with 
probability 1- ppi), the attacker needs go back to the previous state to 
find other paths to reach the final state, and aeCUR is still the same.  
Briefly, the SAPS is the basis to Monte Carlo based attack simulation 
for protection assessment by indicating attack processes on PSAM.   
2) Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation  
Based on this SAPS model, we use the Monte Carlo method to 
manage the SAPS and to provide a randomized simulator emulating the 
attack processes success. The MCAS is illustrated in Figure 2. The key 
component is our SAPS. To run the SAPS, we need to perform an 
initialisation phase in order to build the underlying PN based attack 
model with EC and AE as introduced in Subsection III.B. The result of 
each SAPS is of type Boolean. Then, the Monte Carlo method executes 
the SAPS multiple times. Finally, the simulation provides a probability 
of attack success (the ratio of SAPSs with TRUE in all SAPSs).  
Besides, as introduced in Subsection III.B, specific PSs can decide 
specific ECs in PSAM. Hence, the result of one MCAS process is a 
probability of attack success on one PN based attack model and one PS.  
Monte Carlo based Attack
Simulation
PN based
Attack Model SAPS
Monte Carlo
method
Simulation
results
 
Figure 2. Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation (MCAS) 
In brief, MCAS is the basic tool of ASPCM and ASSPAM.  
B. Attack Simulation based Protection Comparison Model 
We now present our ASPCM. As indicated in Section I, the main 
target of ASPCM is to compare PSs with numeric confidences by means 
of MCAS. To reach this aim, we introduce two such values as Compare 
Confidence and Neutral Confidence.  
Based on Subsection IV.A, a probability of attack success is the 
result of one MCAS process with one PN based attack model and one 
PS. If we compare two Protection Solutions, for instance PS-1 and PS-
2, we can assume that there are two probabilities: p1 and p2 representing 
the results of MCASs being executed based on PS-1 and PS-2 
respectively.  
To describe the confidence of the comparison, it is an intuitive way 
to use the difference of these two probabilities, like 12 pp  under the 
assertion: PS-1 is better than PS-2. Besides, to enhance the previous 
confidence, we consider the situation that these two PSs cannot be 
distinguished, which includes two kinds of events: an attacker can 
successfully break PS-2 while he/she is able to break PS-1; and an 
attacker cannot break PS-2 while he/she is unable to break PS-1. 
Therefore, the probability of these two events can be defined as
)1()1( 2121 pppp uu , which is equation (6). As such, our two 
confidences are expressed by equations (5) and (6).  
For the assertion: PS-1 is better than PS-2, with confidences 
including: 
Compare Confidence (CC):  
12 ppCC                                    (5) 
Neutral Confidence (NeuC):  
212121 ppppNeuC uu                  (6) 
Based on results of MCAS—the probabilities of successful attack, 
the ASPCM consider the comparisons based on assertions (PS-1 is better 
than PS-2, or PS-2 is better than PS-1.) with using the corresponding 
confidence values.  
Therefore, based on MCAS, the ASPCM can generate assertions with 
numeric confidences as the comparison results of various PSs. These 
results can be utilised to generate the final protection assessment results 
of ASSPAM, which will be introduced in the next subsection.  
C. Attack Simulation based Software Protection Assessment 
Method 
In this subsection, we will introduce our novel Attack Simulation 
based Software Protection Assessment Method (ASSPAM), based on 
previous MCAS and ASPCM. 
PS Knowledge
Base ASPCM
MCAS
Analysis and
Assessment
Attack Simulation based Software
Protection Assessment Method
Attack Model
Base
Rules Set
 
Figure 3. Attack Simulation based Software Protection Assessment Method 
(ASSPAM) 
In Figure 3, we depict our ASSPAM. Component “PS Knowledge 
Base” provides all potential Protection Solutions (PSs) as specific and 
validated empirical accumulations of developers and software 
companies. Component “Attack Model Base” provides all PN based 
attack models required to be assessed. In ASPIRE project [1], these two 
bases are provided by other components, and will be out of the scope of 
this paper.  
Component “MCAS” is the simulation part of the whole assessment 
method, and it receives PN based attack models from the “Attack Model 
Base”. Component “ASPCM” receives PS candidates from the “PS 
Knowledge Base”, forwards them to the “MCAS”, and executes “MCAS” 
for comparing these PS candidates by simulation results. Component 
“Rules Set” provides some specific rules to aid comparing results and 
generate specific suitable PSs as final assessment results. These rules 
are specified by implementation situations, and we will deliver some 
examples in Subsection V.C. Component “Analysis and Assessment” 
analyses the results of “ASPCM”—comparison assertions with 
confidences and corresponding software attacks to assess PS candidates 
by “Rules Set” for developers and software companies.  
In ASSPAM, the main process is that users need to set the software 
protection situations firstly (selecting attack models from the “Attack 
Model Base”), including which attacks need to be considered and the 
weights on them. Then, the ASPCM can be triggered to select potential 
PSs (from the “PS Knowledge Base”) to be compared and assessed. 
These potential PSs can be executed by the MCAS for generating related 
probabilities of attacking successful. Based on these probabilities, the 
ASPCM can generate the comparison results between PSs with numeric 
confidences. In the last step, relying on these comparison outputs, users 
can use some specific rules (from the “Rules Set”) to select some 
suitable PSs as the final assessment results of our ASSPAM. These 
results can be used to optimise PSs in the ASPIRE project [1]. 
In short, the ASSPAM executes as sub-routines the ASCPM and the 
MCAS to assess different PSs under the PSAM in order to obtain suitable 
assessment results in terms of software protection requirements (rules).  
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section, we will illustrate our ASSPAM with MCAS and 
ASPCM by implementations and experiments on software protection 
assessment for developers and software companies. Generally speaking, 
the implementation of ASSPAM will be introduced in the order of MCAS, 
ASPCM and ASSPAM. Firstly, we use an example to illustrate the 
implementation on MCAS. Then, we use specific PN based attack 
models to compare various PSs via ASPCM in terms of numeric 
confidences. Lastly, we will analyse the results from ASPCM and 
generate the suitable PSs with rules sets as the final protection 
assessment results of ASSPAM.  
A. Implementation of MCAS 
In this subsection, we use a prototype implementation of MCAS on 
the OTP attack to demonstrate the process of attack simulation. We set 
the ae0 as a normal distribution variable with mean 200 and variance 25.  
Based on the OTP attack model shown in Figure 1, these 11 
transitions can be classified into four categories: Category 1-locating 
code pieces (T0, T6, T8, T9, T10, and T11), Category 2-bypassing or 
tampering code pieces (T1, T4), Category 3-code injecting (T2, T5), and 
Category 4-NULL activities (T3).  
We hosted a student attacking experiment on these attack activities 
in 2015/10/23-2015/10/29 at University of East London, involving 
postgraduates (5 persons), PhD candidates (3 persons), and Post-Docs 
(4 persons). And we can use the time records of this experiment to 
support the setting of EC in each transition in the OTP attack model of 
Figure 1. For example, for the attack activities in Category 2: bypassing 
or tampering code pieces, “attackers” in our experiments spent different 
times: the shortest one is 10 mins, and the longest one is 75 mins. So, 
we can use these “10” and “75” as the boundaries: Mini and Maxi to 
related transitions: T1 and T4 as discussed in Subsection III.B, which be 
used to build the eci as a discrete uniform distribution. Similarly, for 
each other transition, eci can be built on the basis of these shortest and 
longest times.  
Table 2. Time Ranges for Various Attack Activities 
 Category 1 Category 2  Category 3   Category 4  
Time Range 
(mins) 
[3, 120] [10, 75] [50, 110] [0, 0] 
Transitions 
in OTP 
T0, T6, T8, 
T9, T10, 
T11 
T1, T4 T2, T5 T3 
The results of these experiments are summarised in Table 2. As it 
can be observed, the time ranges of attack activities from participants 
can be used to configure these transitions’ EC to demonstrate our 
method in this paper. In future work, we will execute this experiment in 
different groups of people, such as terms of ethic hacker experts, and 
collect more data to simulate real attack processes to match the real 
world.  
Moreover, the “NULL” attack activities, like “T3” in the OTP attack 
model in Figure 1, are some attack steps which do not includes any solid 
attack actions, and are used to represent branching multiple attack paths. 
Hence, its time range is [0, 0], without any time consuming for attackers.  
We therefore obtain the results for MCAS depicted in Figure 4: the 
horizontal axis represents the rounds of SAPS; and the vertical axis is 
the Probability of Successful Attack (PSA). As it can be observed, we 
can find out that by increasing the rounds of SAPS, the probability of 
successful attack becomes stable and is within the interval (2.05%, 
2.22%). If we simulate the impact of different protection methods with 
corresponding different ECs as discussed in Subsection III.B, we will 
obtain different results for PS comparison and protection assessment as 
described in the next subsections.  
 
Figure 4. Probabilities of Successful Attack by MCAS 
B. Implementation on ASCPM 
In this subsection, we discuss a prototype implementation of 
ASCPM based on Subsection V.A to demonstrate PS comparison.  
 
Figure 5. PSAs based on different attacks and PSs 
Currently, our “Attack Model Base” includes three PN based attack 
models (one of them is the OTP attack introduced before, another two 
are attacks on White Box Cryptography and SoftVM [17]), and “PS 
Knowledge Base” currently includes ten PSs for protection assessment 
and software development. Specially, these PSs are randomly generated 
based on some existing protections now [18] and will be improved by 
real usable PSs. Hence, for all these attacks and PSs, we can execute 
MCAS repeatedly and generate the Probabilities of Successful Attack 
(PSAs) depicted in Figure 5. 
 In Figure 5, all PSAs are listed based on different attacks and PSs. 
It can be observed that, there are Attack_1 (the OTP attack), Attack_2 
and Attack_3, and PSs from PS-1 to PS-10. For each PS, there are 
corresponding ECs for each transition in PN based attack models, as 
discussed in Subsection III.B.  
Table 3. Ordered PSs List for Comparison under Each Attack 
Attack PS lists ordered increasingly by PSAs 
Attack_1 PS-8, PS-5, PS-9, PS-2, PS-6, PS-1, PS-10, PS-4, PS-3, PS-7 
Attack_2 PS-4, PS-6, PS-9, PS-1, PS-10, PS-3, PS-2, PS-7, PS-8, PS-5 
Attack_3 PS-5, PS-10, PS-8, PS-7, PS-4, PS-2, PS-6, PS-3, PS-1, PS-9 
Based on the data in Figure 5, we can operate ASPCM with 
confidences. In this part, we will discuss these confidences in different 
attacks. We can list all PSs under each attack increasingly by PSAs as 
Table 3 to compare. For Attack_1, we will compare adjacent PSs pair 
by pair: PS-8 and PS-5, PS-5 and PS-9, PS-9 and PS-2, PS-2 and PS-6, 
PS-6 and PS-1, PS-1 and PS-10, PS-10 and PS-4, PS-4 and PS-3, PS-3 
and PS-7.  
Figure 6 shows the comparisons when they are operated under 
Attack_1. The vertical coordinate is the value of confidences in [0, 1], 
and the horizontal coordinate is the PS list according to Table 3 Row 1. 
There are two lines represented CC and NeuC between all PSs in 
ASPCM. For instance, for PS-8 and PS-5, the assertion “PS-8 is better 
than PS-5”, its CC is very low and NeuC is quite high. In other words, 
for the assertion that PS-8 is better than PS-5, it is not a “positive” 
assertion. On the other hand, for PS-3 and PS-7, its CC may be high 
“adequately” to support the assertion: PS-3 is better than PS-7, to be 
“positive”. These “positive” and “adequately” are decided by specific 
rules in “Rules Set”, and will be implemented in the next subsection.  
 
Figure 6. Confidences under Attack_1 
 
Figure 7. Confidences under Attack_2 
Similarly, Figure 7 and Figure 8 are confidences under Attack_2 and 
Attack_3.  
 
Figure 8.  Confidences under Attack_3 
In brief, we introduced the implementation of ASPCM for PS 
comparison in this subsection, based on MCAS.  
C. Implementation on ASSPAM 
In this subsection, we discuss ASSPAM’s implementation, 
especially the components of “Analysis and Assessment” and “Rules Set” 
in Figure 3, based on previous subsections.  
The implementation of ASSPAM needs to consider the multiple 
attack threats in real software developing and protecting processes. 
Specifically, all attacks need to be evaluated together by specific 
weights. In this regard, one real software protection situation includes 
that the weight of Attack_1 is 1.0 (this attack is the main concern), the 
weight of Attack_2 is 0.0 (Attack_2 will not be considered), and the 
weight of Attack_3 is 0.3 (Attack_3 will be considered, but not as 
important as Attack_1). Besides, the single attack threat can be viewed 
as a special case: only one attack’s weight is 1.0, and other ones are 0.0.   
Table 4. Ordered PSs List for Comparison under Situations 
Situations PS lists ordered increasingly by weighted sums of 
PSAs  
Attack_1(1.0) + 
Attack_2(0.0) + 
Attack_3(0.3)  
PS-8, PS-5, PS-2, PS-6, PS-10, PS-4, PS-1, PS-9, 
PS-3, PS-7 
…… …… 
Hence, in this specific situation, we can obtain an ordered PS list, 
increasingly ordered by the weighted sum of PSAs of each PS under 
different attacks with these weights as Table 4. The obtained 
confidences are depicted in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Comparisons in the specific situation 
In Figure 9, the vertical coordinate is the value of confidences in [0, 
1], and the horizontal coordinate is the PS list in Table 4 Row 1. There 
are four lines represented CC and NeuC between all PSs under Attack_1 
and Attack_3 (which have non-zero weights). This figure illustrates an 
intuitive and detailed picture about all PSs’ assessment in this specific 
situation. For instance, the assertion that PS-8 is better than PS-5, may 
be not very “positive”. And for PS-2 and PS-1, its CC may be “adequate” 
to support the assertion: PS-2 is better than PS-1, to be “positive”.  
In this regard, different developers and software companies have 
their own unique knowledge about these “positive” and “adequate”, 
which are the specific “Rules Sets” for their own. For example, Rule 1 
is “If NeuC is less than 0.85, the two PSs are different in the view of 
protection assessment”, which means “positive”. A different one: Rule 
2 is “If |CC| is smaller than 0.01, and NeuC is more than 0.7, the two 
PSs are the same”, which means “not positive”. Based on these rules, 
we can obtain assessment results as Table 5.  
In Table 5, under Rule 1, PS-8, PS-5 and PS-2 are the three best PSs 
as the assessment results. But under Rule 2, PS-8 and PS-5 are the two 
best PSs as the assessment results; PS-6 and PS-10 are the same in the 
list; the same to PS-1 and PS-9. No rule means that only one PS: PS-8 
will be selected as the assessment result. Therefore, customer-defined 
rules can provide flexible PSs as assessment results, compared to Table 
5 Row 1. This flexibility is also valuable in our ASPIRE project too. 
Hence, this flexibility on assessment results can provide alternatives for 
protection assessment in real software protection situations. 
Table 5. Assessment Results depended on Rules 
Rules Assessment Results 
No Rule PS-8 > PS-5 > PS-2 > PS-6 > PS-10 > PS-4 > 
 PS-1 > PS-9 > PS-3 > PS-7 
Rule 1 PS-8 = PS-5 = PS-2 > PS-6 > PS-10 > PS-4 >  
PS-1 > PS-9 > PS-3 > PS-7 
Rule 2 PS-8 = PS-5 > PS-2 > PS-6 = PS-10 > PS-4 >  
PS-1 = PS-9 > PS-3 > PS-7 
…… …… 
So far, in the specific software protection situation, our ASSPAM 
provides Figure 9 and Table 5 as the final protection assessment results 
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vol. 22, issue 1, pp. 68-86, January 1996. 
[ 3 ] C. K. Cheng, “Evaluation and Measurement of Software Process 
Improvement—A Systematic Literature Review”, IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering, vol.38, issue 2, pp. 398-424, March-April 2012. 
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for developers and software companies: Table 5 outlines flexible 
premier PSs as assessment results; and Figure 9 shows the details about 
these PSs, like confidences of PSs’ comparisons.  
In summary, for real uncertain software attack processes, our Attack 
Simulation based Software Protection Assessment method (ASSPAM) 
with Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation (MCAS) and Attack 
Simulation based Protection comparison Model (ASPCM) can assess 
complicated Protection Solutions (PSs) effectively.   
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Software protection is a critical aspect in software security. In this 
regard, to assess complicated Protection Solutions (PSs) on uncertain 
attack processes, we presented a novel attack simulation based 
protection assessment method called ASSPAM. In this method, Monte 
Carlo based Attack Simulation (MCAS) used PN based attack models to 
simulate attacking processes with different PSs. Based on this attack 
simulation, a novel Attack Simulation based Protection Comparison 
Model (ASPCM) was presented to generate comparisons among 
potential PSs. Finally, ASSPAM was presented to assess software 
protections via the PS comparing results of ASPCM and MCAS. We 
implemented ASSPAM by means of a software protection assessment 
process to demonstrate that our method could provide suitable 
assessments for software developers.   
For future work, we plan to extend our approach by using software 
metrics to improve the assessment methodology and to search for the 
optimal protection solution in other case studies, like digital rights 
management.   
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